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In the existing literature, there are two distinguishing features in oligopolistic 
models: (i) whether the firms' are quantity setting or price setting*, (ii) whether the 
firms produce their output simultaneously or sequentially. Classical models (cf. 
Coumot (1834), Bertrand (1883)，etc.) assume these two features are exogenously 
given. Recent works (Singh and Vives (1984), Dowrick (1986)，van Damme and 
Hurkens (1998, 1999)) attempt to endogenize them. However, their models either 
assume the time of production is exogenously given and only study the endogeniety of 
market variable (cf. Singh and Vives (1984)), or assume the market variable is 
exogenously given and only study the endogeniety of the time of production (cf. van 
Damme and Hurkens (1998, 1999)). 
In this thesis, we develop a coherent approach to capture and endogenize these 
two features in a single model. First, we start with a simple model where the time of 
production is exogenously given (with a exogenous market leader), and firms can 
choose their own market variable before the productions take place. Then we provide 
a complete model where firms can decide both the market variable and the time of 
production. 
Our main results are as follows: In Proposition 1, we show that in the 
differentiated Stackelberg duopoly with exogenous timing, it is a dominant strategy 
for the leader firm to choose the quantity (price) contract if goods produced by 
different firms are substitutes (complements). In Proposition 2, we show that in the 
endogenous timing duopoly with differentiated products, if goods are substitutes 
(complements), it is a dominant strategy for each firm to choose quantity (price) 
contract and produce as early as possible. 
These results extend and generalize the previous results of Singh and Vives 
(1984), Gal-Or (1985) and Dowrick (1986) in several aspects. For example, we extend 
Singh and Vives (1984) and Gal-Or (1985) results, from the case of exogenous timing 
to the case of endogenous timing. We extend Dowrick (1986) result, from the case of 
exogenous market variable to endogenous market variable. 
* If a firm is quantity setting, then its market variable is quantity. If a firm is price 
setting, then its market variable is price. 
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1 Introduction 
Since 1800s, economists (cf. Cournot (1834), Bertrand (1883), etc.) had 
already started to study the phenomenon of market competition among few 
firms, which is now called oligopolistic competition in modern economics. 
The development of game theory since the mid-1900s (cf. von Neumann, 
and Morgenstern (1944), Nash (1951), etc.) had equipped economists with a 
new and powerful tool to explore the new frontier of oligopolistic competition. 
There have been developed a wide variety of oligopolistic models, and they 
commonly have two important distinguishing features: (i) whether the firms 
are quantity setting or price setting^, (ii) whether the firms produce their 
output simultaneously or sequentially. 
Most previous papers and studies (cf. Fellner (1965), Friedman (1977), 
etc.) capture only one of the two features but not both at the same time. 
Moreover, they often assume these features are given exogenously. For exam-
ple, the Cournot model exogenously assumes that firms use quantity setting 
strategy and produce simultaneously. The Bertrand model exogenously as-
sumes that firms use price setting strategy and produce simultaneously. In 
ilf a firm is quantity setting, then its market variable is quantity. If a firm is price 
setting, then its market variable is price. 
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the Stackelberg model (cf. Stackelberg (1934)), firms are exogenously as-
sumed to produce in a sequential manner. 
This thesis provides a coherent framework that captures the two features 
in a single model. The type of firms' choice variable and the time of pro-
duction are endogenously determined. To do this, we will first provide both 
a basic model of differentiated duopoly where the production time is exoge-
nous and the market variable is endogenously determined. Then we give an 
extended model in which both the production time and the market variable 
are endogenously determined. 
Our formulation is as follows. We consider a two-stage duopoly model. 
The demand functions are linear and goods produced by the two firms can be 
either substitutes or complements. Firms are assumed to have zero marginal 
cost and no capacity limits. In our exogenous timing model, firms can choose 
their own market variables (price or quantity) before the productions take 
place. In the endogenous timing model, firms can decide both the market 
variable and the time of production before productions take place. 
Our techniques used to study these two models are based on reaction 
function analysis. First, we derive the reaction functions under the cases that 
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both firms choose the quantity contract. Second we do the same thing under 
the cases that both firms choosing the price contract. Then the reaction 
functions for the cases that the two firms choose different contracts are also 
derived. Prom which we can derive the prices, quantities and profits of both 
firms. Then we compare the prices, quantity and payoffs under these different 
cases and determine the equilibrium of the game. 
To avoid confusion, we want to clarify that in our endogenous timing 
model, a firm can choose the "time of move" but not "the order of move". 
Because a firm cannot unilaterally decide its order of move in a game. For 
example, a firm can only eliminate the possibility of being a follower if it 
chooses to move at the earliest moment, but it cannot ensure itself to be 
a leader, because the other firm may also choose to produce at the same 
time, and simultaneous move will actually happen. On the other hand, if a 
firm chooses not to move until the latest possible moment, it can eliminates 
the possibility of being the leader. However it cannot ensure itself to be a 
follower, because the other firm may also make the same decision and the 
simultaneous move will actually happen. Since the firm can choose only the 
time of move but not the order of move, both the cases of leader-follower and 
simultaneous move are possible. Therefore, we must consider both cases in 
3 
our analysis. 
We now summarize our main results: 
In Proposition 1, we show that in the differentiated Stackelberg 
duopoly with exogenous timing, if goods produced by different 
firms are substitutes (complements), then it is a dominant strat-
egy for the leader firm to choose the quantity (price) contract. 
In Proposition 2, we show that in the endogenous timing duopoly, 
if goods are substitutes (complements), it is a dominant strategy 
for each firm to choose quantity (price) contract and to produce 
as early as possible. 
We will now review several related papers in the literature and compare 
their results with ours. 
1.1 Review of Literature 
The classical Cournot approach^ models oligopolistic competition with the 
assumption that quantity is the market variable: each firm is assumed to use 
~ 2 S e e Mas-Colell and Whiriston (1995)，Section 12.C, or Jean Tirole (1988) Section 2. 
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quantity setting strategy and it chooses its own output level to maximize 
its profit. The classical Bertrand approach^ models oligopolistic competition 
with the assumption that price is the market variable: each firm is assumed 
to use price setting strategy and it chooses its own price level to maximize 
its profit. 
These two different approaches are two different formulations of economics 
behavior hypotheses. It should be clear that they are actually not mathe-
matically equivalent. Many duopoly analyses, such as Hathaway and Rickard 
(1979) and Vives (1985), have attempted to study the differences between 
the equilibrium prices, quantities under quantity competition and those un-
der price competition. In particular, Hathaway and Rickard (1979) shows 
that in a homogenous product oligopoly, the equilibrium price and quantity 
under quantity competition are different from those under price competition. 
For example, the equilibrium price is lower under price competition than 
those under quantity competition. Vives (1985) obtains the same results 
under the product differentiated oligopoly (rather than homogenous prod-
uct). These results establish the idea that price competition is often more 
socially efficient than quantity competition. However, these approaches by 
3See Mas-Colell and Whinston (1995), Section 12.C, or Jean Tirole (1988), Section 2. 
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Hathaway and Rickard (1979) and Vives (1985) and others fail to examine 
the basic problems, such as whether firms prefer setting quantity or setting 
price, and what is the equilibrium market variable. 
Singh and Vives (1984) analyzes these two problems in a product differ-
entiated duopoly with endogenous market variables. It proposes a duopoly 
model with two stages: pre-production stage, (i.e. the stage before the pro-
duction take place), and the production stage. In the pre-production stage, 
each firm can choose one of the two following binding contracts with con-
sumers, either the price contract or the quantity contract. If a firm chooses 
the price contract, it commits to supply the quantity that the consumers 
demand at the predetermined price, no matter what action the rival takes 
in the production stage. If a firm chooses the quantity contract, it commits 
to supply the predetermined quantity at the production stage, independent 
of the rival's action. For each combination of the two firms' choices of con-
tracts in the pre-production stage, the production stage forms a subgame, 
and in that subgame, they use the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium 
(pure strategy). By backward induction, they then find out the equilibrium 
market variable. Then the corresponding equilibrium prices and output lev-
els are determined. They show that if the goods produced by different firms 
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are substitutes, then for each firm it is a dominant strategy to choose the 
quantity contract. If the goods are complements, then it is for each firm a 
dominant strategy to choose the price contract. 
The remarkable result of Singh and Vives (1984) is valid only under the 
circumstance that both firms move (choosing contracts and production) si-
multaneously. However, the assumption of simultaneous move has been 
known to be unrealistic in many cases (cf. Vives (1989)). It is more realis-
tic to assume firms move sequentially in many cases: the first mover act as 
leader and the second mover act as follower. Formal model about sequential 
move game is introduced by Stackelberg (1934). In the standard Stackelberg 
model, the order of move is exogenously given. Most traditional duopoly 
analyses, such as Fellner (1965), follow along this line in studying duopolis-
tic competition. They study the differences of the Stackelberg equilibrium 
outcomes between different assumptions on market variables and products, 
e.g. whether the firms are assumed to be quantity-setting or price-setting, 
whether goods produced by different firms are substitutes or complements, 
and whether the cost structure of firms are the same or not. 
The Stackelberg approach used in the studies such as Fellner (1965) and 
7 
the others assumes exogenously which firm is the leader and which is the fol-
lower. In their analyses, They implicitly assume that the market leader has 
the superior market power (e.g. lower cost), and the first mover advantage. 
They exclude the possibility of the second mover advantage. However, Gal-
Or (1985) shows that the second mover advantage does exist under some 
conditions. Her model is a general two-stage game in which players move 
sequentially with exogenous order of move. It provides several sufficient con-
ditions for the existence of first mover advantage; and it also provides other 
several sufficient conditions for the existence of second mover advantage. In 
more detail, it shows that if firms are in duopolistic price competition and 
goods are substitutes, or if they are in quantity competition and goods are 
complements'^, then the first mover earns lower profit than the second mover. 
Similarly, if firms are in duopolistic quantity competition and goods are sub-
stitutes, or if they are in price competition and goods are complements^，then 
the second mover earns lower profit than the first mover. 
Gal-Or's results on first and second mover advantages naturally lead to 
the question about the choices of time of move of the duopolistic firms: When 
4 Or even more generally, if the players' reaction functions are upward sloping. 
5 Or even more generally, if the players' reaction functions are downward sloping. 
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will they want to be the first mover? When will they want to be the second 
mover? It is natural to ask a further question: When will they actually turn 
out to be a leader; when will they actually turn out to be a follower? Our 
paper studies this question by using a model with endogenous timing. 
To develop a model with endogenous timing where each individual chooses 
its own time of move, we must cover all the Stackelberg cases^. In addition, 
we must not exclude the possibility of simultaneous move. Thus, we must 
cover all the possible situations, calculate the corresponding payoffs, and 
determine which situation gives the highest payoff. 
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) is the first study that completely endog-
enize the time of move. It uses a simple two stage game and allows both 
the simultaneous and sequential move to occur in a two-player contest into 
two games. By comparing the payoffs under simultaneous and those un-
der sequential game, the authors determine what type of the order of move 
(simultaneous or sequential) would occur. 
There are several other existing works on endogenous timing of move 
with different specific duopolistic models. For example, Dowrick (1986) ex-
6i.e. both the case where firm 1 is the leader and firm 2 is the follower, and the case 
where firm 1 is the follower and firm 2 is the leader. 
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amines firms' payoffs on Stackelberg and Cournot outcomes for homogenous 
product duopoly with quantity competition. Van Damme and Hurkens in-
vestigate the price competition and the quantity competition separately in 
two papers (van Damme and Hurkens (1998, 1999)). And they deal with 
the endogenous timing differentiate duopoly with substitutable goods. By 
applying the principle of risk dominance strategy?, these two papers show 
that firms with different attitudes towards risk have different preferences on 
the different sequences of move. 
In summary, Singh and Vives (1984) deals with the endogeneity of market 
variable in a model of simultaneous move duopoly. Gal-Or (1985) shows that 
the second mover advantage does exist, so firms may sometimes want to be 
the leader and sometimes want to be a follower. This arouses the importance 
of endogenous timing in the analysis of oligopoly. Hamilton and Slutsky 
(1990) provides a simple model to endogenize the timing of move in a two-
player, two-stage game; but it is not a study on duopoly model. Dowrick 
(1986) and van Damme and Hurkens (1998, 1999) endogenize the time of 
move in their specific duopoly models, but they do not study the problem of 
endogenous market variables. 
''See Harsanyi and Selten (1988) for details of risk dominance strategy. 
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1.2 Relationships to the existing works 
This thesis provides a coherent framework that includes both the endogeneity 
of market variable and time of move in a simple model. Notice that in this 
paper, as we are considering the endogeneity of the production timing, the 
timing of "move" is defined to be the timing of "production". 
The details of our model have been mentioned in the previous part of 
Section 1. We now compare our model with the above mentioned models. 
We adopt the two-stage duopoly proposed by Singh and Vives (1984). In 
their study, firms produce simultaneously in the production stage. Our study 
captures several features of the timing that Singh and Vives (1984) ignore. 
In our first model where we assume exogenous timing, we use the Stackelberg 
approach. There is an exogenous market leader in the duopoly, which can 
always produce in advance of the follower in the production stage. We then 
further extend our model to a more general model with endogenous timing. 
In that extended model, firms are allowed to choose their own production 
time when they choose the contract in the pre-production stage. 
In contrast to Hamilton and Slutsky (1990)，we specifically formulate a 
duopoly model rather than just study a simple two-player game. In their 
11 
previous work, the authors just provided an abstract model of endogenous 
time of move in a two-player game. Dowrick (1986) and van Damme and 
Hurkens (1998, 1999) study different specific types of duopoly with endoge-
nous timing, but all of them fail to give a coherent framework to endogenize 
both market variable and time of production. They only deal with the prob-
lem of endogenous timing and separate the cases of quantity competition and 
price competition in different studies. 
The following table summaries the comparisons of our study with differ-

































































































































































































































Now, we compare our results with the results of the previous works. 
In Proposition 1, we show that it is a dominant strategy for the leader 
firm to choose the quantity (price) contract if the goods are substitutes (com-
plements). This is closely related to the Proposition 2 of Singh and Vives 
(1984). which shows it is a dominant strategy for the simultaneous move 
firms to choose quantity (price) contract if goods are substitutes (comple-
ments). 
There are also two findings in our Proposition 2. First we prove that in 
the endogenous timing duopoly, it is a dominant strategy for both firms to 
choose the quantity (price) contract if goods are substitutes (complements). 
Second, we prove that firms will choose to produce at the earliest opportunity. 
These two results are closely related to the two propositions of Gal-Or (1985). 
That paper studies an abstract two-player Stackelberg game and finds that 
the slope of the reaction functions does affect which player (the leader or 
the follower) is advantaged. Her conditions for the existence of first mover 
advantage are in spirit same as our Proposition 2. 
Dowrick (1986) shows in its Proposition 1 that, if firms' reaction func-
14 
tions slope downward, then they will both want to be a Stackelberg leader, 
so the firms will move simultaneously. This result is related to our Propo-
sition 2. The author states his Proposition 2 in terms of reaction functions 
and assumes exogenously assigned Stackelberg leader and a follower®; while 
we state our Proposition 2 in terms of the mutual relation of goods (substi-
tutes and complements) and allow that the market variable is endogenized. 
Although our objective is different from his, the conditions of why the firms 
want to be a leader are in spirit the same. 
Our Proposition 2 also relates to the Theorem V of Hamilton and Slutsky 
(1990), which states that in a two-player game, if the slopes of both players's 
reaction functions are of the same sign, then simultaneous move will emerge. 
In our endogenous timing context, firms choose the same type of contract in 
order to attain the first mover advantage, their reaction functions are in turn 
have the same sign of slopes. According to Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), 
both firms move simultaneously. 
The two papers of van Damme and Hurkens (van Damme and Hurkens 
(1998, 1999)) study quantity setting and price setting duopoly separately. 
8 Because the objective of the author is to provide the conditions that when the firm 
want to be a Stackelberg follower. 
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The authors show that in their endogenous timing duopolistic models, a 
Stackelberg leader will emerge (in both of their papers). Their results are 
based on the principle of risk dominant strategy. In their studies of duopoly, 
there is a firm with lower cost (while in our model, both firms have zero 
marginal cost). They prove that the high cost firm will choose to wait and 
the low cost firm will be the Stackelberg leader. These conclusions and 
ours are different: while our Proposition 2 concludes that both firms will 
move simultaneously, they conclude that firms move sequentially; and we 
also consider the endogeneity of market variable. 
The following tables summarize the comparisons of our results with dif-
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After some comparisons between our study with the previous works, we 
are now going to introduce the structure of the rest of this paper. In section 
2, we present the demand model used in our analysis. Section 3 deals with 
the sequential move duopoly with exogenous timing. We then further extend 
our analysis into the sequential move duopoly with endogenous timing in 
Section 4. Concluding remarks follow. Proofs and technical details are given 
in the appendix. 
19 
2 Demand Functions 
We use the linear demand functions in our analysis.^ For simplicity, we 
further assume that the demands for goods produced by different firms are 
symmetric. 
Consider an economy with a monopolistic sector with two firms, namely 
firm 1 and firm 2. They produce differentiated goods, which can be substi-
tutes or complements to each other. There is also a competitive sector as 
a numeraire of price. There is a continuum of consumers of the same type, 
whose utility function is separable and linear in the competitive numeraire 
good. Therefore we can perform the partial equilibrium analysis with only 
the goods produced by the firm 1 and firm 2, which are good 1 and good 2 




where qi is the quantity of good i and pi is the price of good i. Since the 
9 Using linear demand function is standard for the studies of duopoly , for example, 
Singh and Vives (1984), van Damme and Hurkens (1998’ 1999). 
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demand is linear, the function U is quadratic. For analytical reason, we 
assume that; 
U(qu 92) = ct{qi + 92) - + QD + 279i仍]’ （2) 
and assume that: 
a > 0 (3) 
/3 > 0 
m - l7l > 0 
By (2) and (3)，the inverse demands are: 
Pi = oc- (3qi- 792 
P2 = a - p q 2 - (4) 
The goods are substitutes, independent, or complements according to 
whether 7 | 0. Demand function for good i is always downward sloping in 
its own price. Quantity demanded increases with an increase in the price of 
21 
the rival if the goods are substitutes. If goods are complements instead, then 
the quantity demanded decreases with an increase in the rival's price. Note 
that 1^ 1 > I7I. Intuitively, this means the effect of the own quantity is always 
larger than the effect of the rival's quantity on own price, this is a standard 
assumption in the studies of duopoly^®. 
Sometimes, it is more convenient to deal with the direct demands than the 
inverse demands. To derive the direct demands from the inverse demands, it 
is useful to define: 
^ = 沪 - 千 
a 二 (5) 
b = 7 
7 
^ = ^ 
lOlt also ensures the stability of equilibrium. 
22 
Then the direct demands are: 
qi = d — bpi + cp2 
q2 == a - bp2 + cpi (6) 
Throughout this paper, we restrict ourselves to the case where quantities 
and prices are strictly positive, thus quantities are in the region given by: 
n = {pe Rl： a-bpi + cp2> 0, a- bp2 + cpi > 0}. (7) 
Profit of firm i, tu, are given by tt^  = PiQi for i = 1,2, and it is symmetric in 
Pi and qi. 
After the introduction of the demand structure, we are now ready to go 
through the analysis of exogenous timing duopoly. 
23 
3 Exogenous Timing Duopoly 
We will study the determination of market variable in an exogenous timing 
context. The question about endogenous market variable was raised by Singh 
and Vives (1984) initially, which is in a context of simultaneous move duopoly. 
The study here is an extension to the sequential move duopoly. In our setting, 
there is a market leader which can always produce before the follower at the 
production stage, and both the leader and the follower can choose their own 
market variable at the pre-production stage. 
3.1 Description of the game 
Consider a duopoly game with a market leader and a follower; at the pro-
duction stage, the leader can always produce in advance of the follower, and 
the follower can observe the action taken by the leader before its own pro-
duction. Both firms can make two types of contract with consumers at the 
pre-production stage: the quantity contract and the price contract as those 
in Singh and Vives (1984). If a firm chooses the quantity contract, it commits 
to supply a predetermined quantity at the production stage, independent of 
the action of the rival. If a firm chooses the price contract, it commits to 
24 
satisfy the quantity demand corresponding to its predetermined price at the 
production stage independent of the rival's action. The choice of each firm is 
revealed to the rival at the beginning of the production stage, just before the 
leader start to produce. In addition, we assume that the cost associated with 
violating or changing the type of contract to offer consumers is prohibitively 
high, so they compete on the chosen contract without the incentive to deviate 
from the signed contract. We also assume that firms have perfect informa-
tion on the demands, from which they can perform the ex-ante analysis and 
figure out the equilibrium strategy, i.e. the equilibrium price or quantity to 
commit in the pre-production stage. Figure 1 elaborates these relationships 























































































































3.2 Equilibrium Analysis 
Figure 1 shows the relation between the production stage and the pre-
production stage. For each combination of the two firms' choices of contracts 
in the pre-production stage, the production stage forms a subgame, and 
in that subgame, we use the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium (pure 
strategy). By backward induction, they then find out the equilibrium market 
variable. Then the corresponding equilibrium prices and output levels are 
determined. 
We are now going to discuss how to derive the equilibrium choices of con-
tracts. Without loss of generality, we assume that firm 1 is the market leader 
and firm 2 is the follower. The equilibrium payoffs of these four subgames 




Firm 1 Q (7rf,7rf)(兀?,兀『） 
P W，vr!) W，4) 
where firm 1 is the row player and firm 2 is the column player. Q means the 
27 
firm chooses the quantity contract and P means the firm chooses the price 
contract. If both firms choose the quantity contract, the Stackelberg quantity 
competition arises; on the other hand, if both firms choose the price contract, 
the Stackelberg price competition occurs. There are two "mixed-contract" 
subgames in which the firms choose different types of contracts. 
With the derived payoffs given in (8), it can be shown that: 
Trf = TT? (9a) 
7t[ = TT? (9b) 
Tif = Trf (9c) 
4 = nl (9d) 
and it can be shown that if goods produced in different firms are substitutes, 
then the profits of being a Stackelberg quantity leader is strictly larger than 
that of being a Stackelberg price leader, i.e. 
Trf > TT; (10) 
The proof of (10) is given in the appendix. 
28 
Having these equalities and ranking, we obtain the following best re-
sponses of the firms; they are presented in the following game tables. 




Firm 1 Q [1] [1] 
P 




Firm 1 Q [indifferent] 
P [indifferent 
We put the number 1 in the square brackets to indicate that firm 1 will choose 
the corresponding action in the corresponding column. For example, if firm 
2 chooses the quantity contract, then the best response for firm 1 is to choose 
the quantity contract, so we put [1] in the entry corresponding to the case 
of (Q,(3). Note that for firm 2，when firm 1 chooses the quantity contract, 
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it is indifferent for it to choose the quantity contract or the price contract; 
so we put [indifferent] in the entries corresponding to the cases of (Q, Q) 
and (Q, P). On the other hand, if firm 1 chooses the price contract, it is also 
indifferent for firm 2 to choose the quantity contract or the price contract.; so 
we also put [indifferent] in the entries corresponding to the cases of (P, Q) and 
(P, P). Prom these best responses, it is obvious that the quantity contract is 
a dominant strategy for firm 1; and both (Q, Q) and (Q, P) are equilibria in 
this case. 
If goods are complements to each other, then the profit of being a Stack-
elberg quantity leader is strictly less than that of being a Stackelberg price 
leader, i.e. 
Tlf < tA (13) 




Firm 1 Q 
P [1] [11 
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Firm 1 Q [indifferent 
P [indifferent] 
It is obvious that the price contract is a dominant strategy for firm 1; in this 
case, both (P, Q) and (P, P) are Nash equilibria. 
Proposition 1 summarizes the results. 
Proposition 1 In the simple contract duopoly with exogenous timing: 
(i) It is a dominant strategy for the leader firm to choose the quantity 
contract if the goods produced by different firms are substitutes to each other, 
and it is indifferent for the follower firm to choose either the quantity contract 
or the price contract. So both (Q,Q) and (Q,P) are equilibria. 
(ii) It is a dominant strategy for the leader firm to choose the price con-
tract if the goods produced by different firms are complements to each other, 
and it is indifferent for the follower firm to choose either the price contract 
or the quantity contract. So both (P, P) and (P, Q) are equilibria. 
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Proof: See Appendix 
This result is related to Proposition 2 of Singh and Vives (1984). which 
shows it is a dominant strategy for the simultaneous move firms to choose 
quantity (price) contract if goods are substitutes (complements). The dif-
ference is that in our model, only the leader firm does concern the choice of 
contract. The following geometrical analysis explains why the two market 
variables are indifferent to the follower. 
In order to compare the profit levels of different contract choices, we 
should characterize the equilibria of Stackelberg quantity competition and 
Stackelberg price competition in the same space. First, we focus on the case 
that goods are substitutes, we consider the price space, i.e. the (pi,p2)-space. 
From the given demands, we can derive the reaction functions of both 
firms in the price space, the details can also be found in the appendix. If 




Then we can write down the reaction of each firm as the equation of straight 
line in the (pi,p2)-space: 
: V2 = -Pi (17) 
7 a{(3 - 7) 
If both firms choose the quantity contract, firm i,s reaction function is: 
QF 5 - (18) 
Substituting the inverse demand into this reaction, we can get the reaction 
function in the (pi’p2)-space: 
h , oW —力 n o � 
抖 巧 + (19) 
Then we can write down the reaction of each firm as the equation of straight 
line in the (pi,p2)-space: 
拓 ： 仍 = 仍 T ~ ( ) 
h , o ^ —力 
场 ： 仍 仍 + 
3 3 
From the derived reaction functions, we can rank the relative magnitude of 
their intercepts and slopes. Their intercepts are ranked as: 
i^i's intercept = RiS intercept < 0 < R2S intercept < R2S intercept 
and their slopes are ranked as: 
•R2，s slope < R2S slope < RiS slope < RiS slope 
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Figure 2 is the plot of these reactions. 
一 尺 1 ) 
Figure 2. Trf, and tt�in the (pi, p2)-space 
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The isoprofit curve of firm i in the price space is convex viewed from the 
axis of Pi and profit increases away from the axis of Pi. If firm 1，the market 
leader, chooses the price contract, its maximum profit is given by the isoprofit 
curve •k[ that is as far away from the pi-axis as possible and still has one point 
in common with R2. Point A in Figure 1 is such Stackelberg equilibrium with 
price leadership. On the other hand, if firm 1 chooses the quantity contract, 
its maximum profit is given by the isoprofit curve 7rf farthest away from the 
pi-axis and tangent to R2. Point B in Figure 1 is such Stackelberg equilibrium 
with quantity leadership. It is obvious that the vertical intercept and slope of 
互2 is larger than that of R2. So 7rf > 7r{ in this case, and quantity contract 
is the dominant strategy for firm 1. For firm 2, by choosing to set its price or 
quantity, induces firm 1 to have price reaction (Ri) or quantity reaction(i^i) 
respectively, but its own reaction is determined by the choice of firm 1 and 
is independent with its own action. 
If firm 1 chooses a type of contract and decides to produce at a point 
on firm 2，s reaction curve, for example, point B in this case; firm 2 will also 
produce at this point (on the isoprofit curve n^), regardless of firm 2's choices 
of contract, since the choice of firm 2 only affects the conjectures of firm 1, 
but not its own reaction. 
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Therefore it is indifferent for the follower firm to choose price contract or 
quantity contract. 
After discussing the case of substitutable goods, we now consider the 
other case where the goods are complements. We consider the (g2, gi)-space. 
The analysis is the same as the substitutes case, except that we interchange 
the roles of quantity and price, we get a similar figure as Figure 1, with Ri 
becoming the quantity reaction function of firm i and Ri becoming the price 
reaction function of firm i. Then it follows that tt^ > Trf in this case. 
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4 Endogenous Timing Duopoly 
In this section, we extend the analysis to endogenize timing, i.e. the time of 
move is resulted from the decision of firms. Therefore the time of production 
takes place in the production stage will also be included in the contract that 
firms make with consumers. 
4.1 Description of the game 
The previous model is exogenous timing and the contract just includes the 
choice of market variable. Now we are going to discuss the endogenous tim-
ing model. The contract becomes more complicated: besides the choice of 
market variable, the firms also need to choose their time of production in 
the contract. We call this type of contract a "composite contract". Consider 
a duopoly game in which firms can make two types of time-composite con-
tract with consumers at the pre-production stage: the quantity composite 
contract and the price composite contract. If a firm chooses the quantity 
composite contract, it commits to supply the predetermined quantity at the 
predetermined time t at the production stage, where t G [0,1], t = 0 is the 
beginning of the production stage and t = 1 is the end of the production 
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stage. The action is independent of the action of the rival. If a firm chooses 
the price composite contract, it commits to satisfy the quantity demand cor-
responding to the predetermined price at the predetermined time t specified 
in the contract independently. The details of the contracts are revealed to 
both firms at the beginning of the production stage. If the firms choose to 
produce at different points of time at the production stage, then the firm 
which has chosen a later time of production can observe the action chosen 
by the firm playing first, giving rise to the Stackelberg subgame. If the firms 
choose to produce at the same time, a simultaneous play subgame occurs. 
As in the previous section, we assume that the cost associated with violating 
or changing the type of contract is prohibitively high. So once the firms 
choose which type of contract and when to offer consumers, they compete on 
the chosen contract independently without any incentive to deviate from the 
signed contract. We also assume that firms have perfect information on the 
demands, from which they can perform the ex-ante analysis and figure out 
the equilibrium strategy, i.e. the equilibrium price or quantity to commit in 
the pre-production stage. Figure 2 elaborates these relationships between 







































































































4.2 Equilibrium Analysis 
Figure 2 shows the relation between the production stage and the pre-
production stage. For each combination of the two firms' choices of contracts 
in the pre-production stage, the production stage forms a subgame, and 
in that subgame, we use the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium (pure 
strategy). By backward induction, they then find out the equilibrium market 
variable. Then the corresponding equilibrium prices and output levels are 
determined. The details of reaction function analysis are presented in the 
appendix. 
The equilibrium outcomes of these subgames are derived by 
Firm 2 
Ql Qf Pl Pf 
Ql (计，⑷ ⑦ � ， 9 1 � 
一 一 （21) 
F i r m l Qp (7rf,7r 幻（7rf,7rf) (7r?,7r^) (7r?’7r?) 
Pl (7rf,7r?) (7r?,7rl) (7rf ’7i f ) [ A A ) 
Pf (7rf,7r?) ( 7 r f ’ 7 r J )(兀{乂2 ) (7rf’7rf) 
where firm 1 is the row player and firm 2 is the column player. It is easy to see 
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that if the firm wants to be the first mover, it will commit to produce as early 
as possible, that is, at t = 0. On the other hand, if the firm want to be the 
second mover, then it will commit to produce at the latest opportunity, that 
is, &t t = 1.Therefore, only four types of contracts are relevant; Q l means 
the firm chooses the quantity contract and commits to produce at t = 0 . 
QF means the firm chooses the quantity contract and commits to produce at 
t = 1. Pl means the firm chooses the price contract and commits to produce 
at t = 0. Pf means the firm chooses the price contract and commits to 
produce at t = 1. If both firm choose the same type of contract, the Cournot 
type or Bertrand types of competition occurs. Stackelberg (quantity or price) 
types of competition arise if the firms choose the same type of contract with 
different committed time of production. 
By routine calculation, we derive the payoffs which prove that if goods 
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are substitutes, then the following (22) and (23) hold 
Trf > Trf (22a) 
Trf > ttJ (22b) 
TT? > 7T{ (22C) 
4 > < (22d) 
7t\ > Trf (22e) 
Trf > Trf (22f) 
and: 
於 > 兀f (23) 
Then by (22) and (23), we obtain the best responses of the firms; they 
are described by the following game tables. 
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Firm I's (the row player) best responses are 
Firm 2 
Ql Qf Pl Pf 
Ql w W W [11 ⑶ ） 
Firm 1 Qp 
Pl 
Pf 
Firm 2's (the column player) best responses are 
Firm 2 
Ql Qf Pl Pf 
Ql [2) 
(25) 
Firm 1 Q f [2] 
Pl [21 
Pf [ 2； 
The number i {i = 1,2) in the square brackets indicates the row (column) 
player will choose the corresponding action at the corresponding column 
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(row). For example, if firm 2 chooses the quantity contract and commits to 
produce at t = 0, firm I's best response is choosing the quantity contract 
and produce at the same time, so we place the number [1] in the entry 
corresponding to the case of (QL^QL)- It is obvious that the unique pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium in this case is that both firms choose the quantity 
contract and commit to produce at t = 0; and it is also a dominant strategy 
equilibrium. 
If goods produced by different firms are complements, then (26) and (27) 
hold: 
tt[ > nf (26a) 
Trf > Trf (26b) 
Trf > Trf (26c) 
Trf > Trf (26d) 
Trf > Trf (26e) 
Trf > TT? (26f) 
and also: 
兀f > (27) 
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According to (26) and (27), we obtain the best responses of the firm in 
the production stage subgame; they are given by the following tables. 
Firm l’s (the row player) best responses are 
Firm 2 
QL QF PL PF 
QL , � 
(28) 
Firm 1 Q f 
PL [1] [1] [1] [1] 
PF 
Firm 2's (the column player) best responses are 
Firm 2 
QL QF PL PF 
QL [2] 
(29) 




The unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this case is that both firms 
choose the price contract and commit to produce at t = 0. Again, it is also 
a dominant strategy equilibrium. 
Proposition 2 summarizes the results of these two cases. 
Proposit ion 2 In the composite contract duopoly with endogenous timing, 
it is a dominant strategy for each firm to choose the quantity (price) contract 
and commit to produce at t = Q if the goods produced by different firms are 
substitutes (complements). 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Clearly, the exogenous timing duopoly given in section 3 is a subcase of 
the endogenous timing duopoly discussed here. One can see that the former 
result (Proposition 1) will not arise when both firms are allowed to choose 
their own time of production. 
This proposition is closely related to the two propositions of Gal-Or 
(1985). She studies an abstract two-player Stackelberg game and finds that 
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the slope of the reaction functions does affect which player (the leader or 
the follower) is advantaged. While our study is not explicitly concerning the 
slope of the reaction functions, the slope of the reaction functions are in fact 
determined by the choice of market variable and the mutual relation of the 
goods. Since we allow the firms to choose their own market variable as well 
as the time of production, each firm can in turn decide the slope (positive or 
negative) of the rival's reaction function by choosing different market vari-
able. What we can see in our study is that despite of the possibility of second 
mover advantage (Proposition 1 of Gal-Or (1985))’ no firm will wait to be 
the second mover for this type of advantage. Because each of them know that 
the other firm will choose to attain the first mover advantage by choosing 
the "right" type of contract (as stated in Proposition 1 of Gal-Or (1985), for 
the existence of first mover advantage) and produce at the earliest possible 
opportunity. 
Now we go through a brief geometrical elaboration of the result. 
First, we consider the case where goods are substitutes; we consider the 
reaction functions of both firms in the (pi,p2)-space. 
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參: 
Figure 4. Trf and in the (pi, P2)-space 
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The reaction nomination of Figure 4 is the same as Figure 2, Ri is the 
price reaction function of firm i, while Rt is the quantity reaction function of 
firm i in the (pi,p2)-space. Point M and N are the Bertrand equilibria (cor-
responding to the cases of (Pl, PL) and (Pf , PF)) and Cournot Equilibrium 
(corresponding to the cases of (QL.QL) and (QF,QF)) respectively. Point 
D is the Nash equilibrium when firm 1 chooses quantity contract and firm 2 
chooses the price contract and they produce at the same time (correspond-
ing to the cases of (Ql, PL) and [QF, PF))- E is the Nash equilibrium when 
firm 1 chooses price contract and firm 2 chooses quantity contract and they 
produce at both firms produce at the same time (corresponding to the cases 
of {PL,QL) and (PF,QF))- We have already shown in Figure 2 that the 
Stackelberg equilibrium with firm 1 as the quantity leader must lies between 
point D and N, and it is obvious that it gives the highest possible profit level 
for firm l(7rf). By the virtue symmetry, the Stackelberg equilibrium with 
firm 2 as the quantity leader must lies between point N and E, which gives 
the highest possible profit level for firm 2(7rJ). So [ Q l M l ] is the dominant 
strategy equilibrium in this case, and both firm get the Cournot profit level 
(兀?). 
Finally, we consider the case of complementary goods. By interchanging 
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the roles of quantity and price in the (q'2, Q'l)—space, we can get the similar 
figure as Figure 4, and then it follows that tt- is the highest possible profit 
level. 
After the analsis of endogenous timing model, we are now going to sum-
marize our results. 
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5 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we provide a coherent framework that endogenize both mar-
ket variable and timing in a single model. First, we study the exogenous 
timing model. In this model, we show that in the differentiated duopoly 
with exogenous timing, if goods produced by different firms are substitutes 
(complements), then it is a dominant strategy for the leader firm to choose 
the quantity (price) contract. And we also show that the follower firm is 
indifferent to choosing either the quantity contract or the price contract. 
We then further extend the model to allow each firm to choose their 
own time of production. In this model, we show that in the differentiated 
duopoly with endogenous timing, if goods are substitutes (complements), 
then for each firm, it is a dominant strategy for each firm to choose quantity 
(price) contract and to produce as early as possible. 
We completely endogenize both the time of production and market vari-
able in the duopolistic model, which is not done in the existing literature. As 
Singh and Vives (1984) only study the model of endogenous market variable; 
Dowrick (1986) and van Damme and Hurkens (1998, 1999) only study the 
endogenous timing. 
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Our results are restricted to the case where all demand functions are lin-
ear, and in general, it cannot be applied to the case of non-linear demands. 
However, if the demand is nearly linear, i.e. very close to some linear one, it 
may follow our linear results. Since the payoff of choosing quantity (price) 
contract is shown to be strictly higher in the case of substitutes (comple-
ments) with the assumption of linear demand. However, the case for the 
general non-linear demand remains unknown, and it is worth to extend this 
problem. 
Our results of exogenous timing model imply that for substitutes, quan-
tity competition is a likely competition mode; and for complements, price 
competition is a likely mode. The intuition behind this result is as follows. 
Consider the case of compelments. In this case, each of the firms is not only 
a competitor with the other, but they should have a degree of 'corporation', 
i.e. one should consider the sales of the other as their products are comple-
ments. By the definition fo complements, the demand for a good is affected 
by the price its complement, i.e. each firm can easily adjust the sales of the 
other by setting its own price. Therefore it is a dominant strategy of both 
firms to choose price contract in the case of complements. 
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In the case of substitutes, both firms are competitive and they should 
compete for the market share. Both of them realize that if they try to 
expand the market share by undercutting the other, their rival will 'revenge' 
by also undercutting; the ultimate result of this viscous circle is both of them 
will continue to undercut the other until the price is equal to the unit cost, 
i.e. they earn zero profit. Therefore no one would choose the price contract 
in the case of substitutes. 
Our results are also empirically testable. As Bresnahan (1987) shows 
that the oligopolistic structure (Cournot or Bertrand) could be identified 
empirically, e.g. U.S. automobile industry follows the Bertrand mode com-
petition during the price war. Recent studies such as Berry (1994) performs 
the empirical study in the retail gasoline industry in U.S., which is a prod-
uct differentiation oligopoly, and it shows the empirical evidence that this 
industry follows the Bertrand mode of competition. 
One possible way to study our result empirically is to study the price 
changes with corresponding quantity changes of some selected industries (e.g. 
retail gasoline industry, airline, etc.). By observing the dataset, the strategies 
of the players may be inferred. For example, if we found that the firms often 
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t 
change their quantity of production in advance of the change of price, we can 
view that they are quantity setting firms. If these firms produce substitutes, 
then our results are empirically supported. 
Another possible extension of this line of research is to increase the num-
ber of firm to some finite number N rather than only two firms. However, 
this extensions require more sophisticated mathematical tool. 
We have investigate the question of endogenous timing and endogenous 
market variable in the duopolistic model. However, we have not investigated 
the question that among the price setting model, the quantity setting model, 
the simultaneous move model or the sequential move model is (are) the most 
realistic model(s). The reason is that an industry fits sequential move game 
or simultaneous move; quantity setting or price setting are all reflecting the 
characteristic of the industry, for example, the technology of production and 
the existing market share within the industry. So it is still an open question 
for which setting of model is the best abstract to the reality. 
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6 Appendix 
In this appendix we present the reaction function analysis for the mod-
els discussed in Section Sand Section 4, and then complete the proofs of 
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. 
6.1 Reaction functions in the Exogenous Timing Model 
There are four possible cases corresponding to the choices of firms in the 
pre-production stage. 
Case 3.1 Suppose firm 1 chooses quantity contract and firm 2 chooses quan-
tity contract. (This is the Stackelberg type of quantity competition, corre-
sponding to the case (Q,Q).) 
Firm 2: 
max q2(a - (5q2 一 79i) (30) 
<72 
this maximization yields the reaction function: 
R舶：仍=J - 盖 ( 3 1 ) 
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Firm 2: 
max qi{a - Pqi - 7^2(^1)) (32) 
Ql 
Then we can derive the quantities and prices: 
r 2oi(5 — cry , � 
必 = ( 3 3 a ) 
= 守 (33b) 
= (33c) 
p � = ^ ^ (33d) 
Therefore, the profits are: 
= ( 3 4 ) 
1 8/3(2沪-72) 
_ —2外 - 7〒 (35) 
Case 3.2 Suppose firm 1 chooses price contract and firm 2 chooses price 
contract. (This is the Stackelberg type of price competition, corresponding to 
the cases (P ,P) . ) 
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Firm 2: 
max p2(a - bp2 + cpi) (36) 
P2 
this maximization yields the reaction function: 
丑 2(Pi):P2 = 盖 + 盖Pi (37) 
Firm 1: 
max Pi (a — bpi + cR^ipi)) (38) 
p i 
Then we can derive the quantities and prices: 
, 2ab + ac 
d 二 (39a) 
f Aab"^ - ac? + 2abc ,德、 
= 4 ( 2 6 2 - _ 
2ab + ac (39c) 
巧 462 _2C2 、‘ 
J _ 偏 2 - + 2abc 
朽 _ 46(262 - c2) � , 
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Therefore, the profits are: 
兀 1 — 8 / 3 ( 2 / 3 2 - 7 ) ( ) 
f — 0^2(4沪+ — 72)2 (/3 — 
兀2 - 16/3(2沪-7〒(/3 + 7) 、 ) 
Case 3.3 Suppose firm 1 chooses quantity contract and firm 2 chooses price 
contract. (This is corresponding to the cases (Q, P).) 
Firm 2: 
P2 7仍、 (An\ 
mp�仍(万 T T � (42) 
this maximization yields the reaction function: 
丑 2 ( g i ) : = 署 一 (43) 
Firm 1: 
max ( a n + aR2(gi))专 （44) 
qi 0 
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Then we can derive the quantities and prices : 
必 = 鮮 (45a) 
- ；二广 _ 
Q 2(x(5 — on 
Pl = ^ ^ ( 4 5 c ) 
P - 2cxh - a千 
巧 = 4 ( 2 沪 - 7 2 ) 
Therefore the profits are: 
Q _ (2a/3 - a7)2 
兀 1 —明(2/32-72) ( ) 
— a 2 ( 4 沪 - 2 / 3 7 - 7 � ⑷） 
Case 3.4 Suppose firm 1 chooses price contract and firm 2 chooses quantity 
contract. {This is corresponding to the cases (P,Q).) 
Firm 2: 
+ (48) 
92 f j p p 
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this maximization yields the reaction function: 
D , � aj + 7Pi ,川、 
丑2(Pi) : Q2 二 _ — ^2) (49) 
Firm 1: 
max —号—]丑2(Pi)] (50) 
Pl P P P 
Then we can derive the quantities and prices: 
& = W ^ ) ( ) 
巧 _ 偶2/52-72) � 0 J 
Therefore the profits are: 
= 柳 + 7)2(/3-7) (52) 
1 8/3(2沪-72)(/3 + 7) 
= , 2 ( 4 / 3 2 + 2 外 - 7 〒 ( / 3 - 7 ) (53) 
2 — 16风2/32-7〒(/3 + 7) 
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6.2 Reaction functions in the Endogenous Timing Model 
Half of the subgames in the Section 4 are equivalent to those of Section 3, 
therefore we just go through eight subgames (in three cases) here. 
Case 4.1 Suppose firm 1 chooses quantity contract and firm 2 chooses quan-
tity contract, and h = t:人 This is the Coumot type of competition, corre-
sponding to the cases (QL,QL) and (QF,QF)-； 
Firm i: 
max qi{a - (3qi - ^qj) (54) 
Qi 
this maximization yields the reaction function: 
RiiQj) =告-知j (55) 
for i = 1,2 and i j.Then we can derive the quantities and prices for both 
firms: 
qC = (56a) 
2/9 + 7 
(細） 
2/3 + 7 
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The profits are given by: 
兀i 二 W ^ i (57) 
for i = 1,2. 
Case 4.2 Suppose firm 1 chooses price contract and firm 2 chooses price 
contract, and h 二 t2.�This is the Bertrand type of competition, corresponding 
to the cases (PL, PL) and {PF.PF)-) 
Firm i: 
max pi{a 一 bpi + cpj) (58) 
Pi 
this maximization yields the reaction function: 
似巧.):”《=盒+盖巧. （则 
for 2 = 1,2 and 2 j.Then we can derive the quantities and prices for both 
firms: 
B = (60a) 
2b-c 
pB = (60b) 
Pl 2b - c 
6 3 
Therefore the profits are: 
— a W - 7 ) (61) 
〜—（/3 + 7)(2/3 - 7)2 (bl) 
for i 二 1,2. 
Case 4.3 Suppose firm i chooses quantity contract and firm j chooses price 
contract, and U = tj. (This is the mixed competition, corresponding to the 
cases {QL.PL), {QF, PF),{PL.QL) and (Pf,Qf)J 
Firm i: 
m a x ^{a-qi + cpj) (62) 
Qi b 
this maximization yields the reaction function: 
FU(Pj) : Qi 二誉 + ^Pj (63) 
for 2 = 1,2 and i + j. 
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Firm j: 
max ^ { a - p j +'yqi) (64) 
Pj P 
this maximization yields the reaction function: 
聯..Pj =�-如 (65) 
Then we can derive the prices and quantities: 
# 二 f - 7) (66a) 
豆 = ( 6 6 b ) 
/3[4(沪—72) + 72] 
Therefore the profits are: 
^Q = (67) 
么 一 
， = ( e g ) 
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6.3 Proofs for Inequalities (10), (13) and 
Proposition 1 
We want to show: 
7rf ^TTi when 7 ^ 0 . (69) 
First, we need to find the relationship between Tif and 7t[. It is straightforward 
to consider their difference: 
I _ (2a/3 - a ^ ? a2(2/3 + 7)2(卢一7) _ 
兀 - 8 / 3 ( 2 / 3 ^ - 7 ^ ) " 8 / 3 ( 2 / 3 ^ - 7 ' ) ( ^ + 7 ) 
= r 3 
— � / 3 ( 2 / 3 2 — 7 2 ) 0 0 + • 
Then by (69) and (3), we have: 
_ _ ^ > 0 (71) 
therefore, the sign of 7 determine the sign of Trf - 7r[. If 7 > 0’ (i.e. the 
goods are substitutes) then 7if — t t ^ � 0 or T r f � 7 r i . If 7 < 0, (i.e. the goods 
are complements) then tt{ < 7r{. This proves the inequalities (10) and (13), 
which give the best response functions (11)，(12), (14) and (15) in Section 3. 
Then Proposition 1 follows. (Q.E.D.) 
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6.4 Proofs for Inequalities (22), (23), (26), (27) and 
Proposition 2 
We will first prove inequalities (22) and (23), and then prove (26) and (27). 
With these inequalities, we will complete the proof of Proposition 2. 
6.4.1 Proofs for Inequalities (22) and (23) with 7 > 0 
Inequality (22a): [7rf > 7rf] By (34) and (57), we have: 
^ = 1 6 � 4 - 8 /32f + 74 (72) 
16々 4 —8 矿 72 • 
Which is larger than one for all 7 satisfy (3), and both 7 > 0 and 7 < 0. So 
Trf > 7rf. 
Inequality (22b): [vrf > 7rf] By (57) and (67), we have: 
^ = + (73) 
^ - 16/36 一 24/3472+ 9/3274 - 76' 
Which is larger than one for all 7 satisfy (3), and both 7 > 0 and 7 < 0. So 
TTf > TT?. 
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Inequality (22c): [ttJ > Trf] By (67) and (41): 
^ = 16(-2/3 + 7)2(0+ 7)2(-2沪+ 7〒 
Trf — (4沪—3 7 � ( —4沪-2 / 3 7 + 7 � • ^ ^ 
Note that the numerator minus the denominator is equal to: 
64/35)3 + 64沪74 - 48^)5 + 52沪76 + W + 778. (75) 
Which is positive for all 7 satisfy (3) and 7 � 0 . So t tJ > Trf. 
Inequality (22d): [k{ > tt^ ) By (41) and (40): 
^ = (-4矿-2/37 + 7 〒 _ 
TT; —2(2/3+ 7)2(2矿一72) • 
The difference of the numerator minus the denominator is: 
4^7^ + 37' (77) 
which is larger than zero for all 7 satisfy (3) and 7 > O.So Trf > tt-. 
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Inequality (22e): [ ttJ > 7rf] By (40) and (61): 
± 一 1 6 / ^ 4 - 8 / 3 ? + 74 
^ 一 1 6 沪 - 带 千 • 网 
Which is larger than one for all 7 satisfy (3), and both 7 > 0 and 7 < O.So 
A > Trf. 
Inequality (22f): [nf > Trf] By (61) and (68): 
Trf _ 16/f - 16矿7 - 24/35)2 + 24/3^^ + _ _ 
^ = - 16/3% - 24矿72 + 24/3473 + g f^iSyi _ 9/32)5 —外6 + • 
Which is larger than one for all 7 satisfy (3) and 7 > O.So Trf > Trf. 
Inequality (23): [Trf > Trf] By (57) and (35): 
Trf 二 16(-2/33 + / 3 7 � 
Trf — (-8/33+ 4 外 2 + 73)2 • 
The difference of the numerator minus the denominator is: 
16沪73-8/375 —76. (81) 
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which is larger than zero for all 7 satisfy (3) and 7 > 0. So Trf > Trf. 
6.4.2 Proofs for Inequalities (26) and (27) with 7 < 0 
Inequality (26a): > Trf] Same as (22e). 
Inequality (26b): [Trf > Trf] Same as (22f). 
Inequality (26c): [Trf > Trf] By (68) and (35): 
i = 1 6 ( 2 / 3 2 - 7 2 -州 2 ( 2沪 - 7〒 _ 
^ - (4沪 一 3)2)2 (4沪-2外 _ 2^)2 • V ) 
Note that the difference of the numerator minus the denominator is: 
+ 64沪74 + 48/33)5 _ 52沪/ — 制 + 讨. (83) 
For all 7 satisfy (3) and 7 < 0, expression (82) is larger than the following 
expression: 
+ 64/34|7|4 - 48/3'|7|3 — + 4^71' + 7|7|® (84) 
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and (83) is larger than zero, so (82) is strictly larger than zero. Therefore 
Trf > ttI 
Inequality (26d): [7rf > irf] By (35) and (34): 
^ = 16/3^  - 1 6 / 3 ^ 7 + W + 7^ (85) 
“ 16/34 - 16沪7 - 4/3^2 + 8/^ 73 — ^ ) 
The difference of the numerator minus the denominator is: 
+ 74 (86) 
Expression (85) is larger than zero for all 7 satisfy (3) and 7 < 0. So 7rf > 7if. 
Inequality (26e): [tt^ > 7rf] Same as (22a). 
Inequality (26f): [Trf > 7rf] Same as (22b). 
Inequality (27): [yrf > 7rf] Consider: 
！ [ I = 16(—2/33 + 外 2)2 
7r{ ~ (8^^-4/372 + 7')' 
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The difference of the numerator minus the denominator is: 
—73(16/33-8/372 + 73) (88) 
For all 7 satisfy (3) and 7 < 0, it is larger than zero. So nf > 7r{. 
6.4.3 Proof for Proposition 2 
With the inequalities (22), (23), (26), (27) and the equalities (9a), (9b), (9c) 
and (9d), we can derive the best responses functions (24), (25), (28) and (29) 
in Section 4. So Proposition 2 follows. (Q.E.D.) 
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